Plato's Republic

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Dec. 18, 1930

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A. Apology for Method. Introduction.

It is the custom for publishers to number the pages of a book, thus: 1-2-3-4-5 and so forth, until the work has run its course, when it is suffixed with a couple of blank pages and embraced – "summed up" as it were, by two covers, one on the front and one on the back of what has become a book. These neat units of paragraph, page and chapter are strictly artificial; as to identity an accumulation of thought with an accumulation of paper, having but one and the same word to express both – the word "book" itself. For three reasons, principally, I am not justified in following the "Republic" page for page in making this report.

In the first place, "Alpha and Omega" is a title which applies to the Lord alone, a beginning and an end being characteristic of no fact observed by us. That is to say, the story is never told out. Yet man hungers for finality; he wants to put a cover on the book, so that he may say, "here it begins and here it ends." The medieval theologians could not rest content till they had written Finis to the scriptures, calling it sealed book, refusing to recognize that the work of God is never ended. In the same spirit, with the same anxiousness one's thumb on infinity, one works for a degree to represent a process of thought which is infinite by a tangible device. The idea of the Republic, if it has a beginning and an end at all, is still too great to confine within any number of pages one might imagine, and having no known beginning nor end cannot, as Zeno would show, be divided up into points at all.

"We cannot learn philosophy, we can only be philosophers" (says Max Mueller). Socrates, in "Meno," leads a small boy, by a series of simple yes-no questions into the declaration of the Pythagorean theorem, and thereby shows that things cannot be "taught," (the idea of injection being implied, else we could teach blocks and stones), but merely suggested, the process of learning, or understanding being one of recognition. I would not be justified in following the book order of the Republic, even though I had the best of reasons for believing it were the best, until, independent of all authority, I should recognize it superiority, which, however unfortunately, I do not. "Philosophy is the love of the wholeness of things." In reading the eighth book of the Republic one is apt to completely lose sight of the first. In viewing matrimony we forget about wealth and war, etc., all of which have great and direct effect on matrimony. It is because our weak powers of mind only allow for the usual consideration of just one thing at a time that it is necessary to set things in a row. In view of the perfect interdependence of all things, science, which is the ordering and classification of knowledge, is a crutch, an aid to the weak of comprehension. In classifying fish together, I am separating fish from planets, which I have no warrant for doing; the crutch can help me to hobble but never to run.

Over and above such reasons, all possibility of the book arrangement being the best to follow is precluded by Socrates' statement of the course of procedure: "Whither the argument shall blow us, thither we shall go." The chances of that wind blowing in a direct line from the first word to the last conclusion are scant enough to allow their being ignored.

B. The Drama of the Republic

The scene and story of Socrates' great exposition is of relatively little dramatic interest. After the first page it consists merely of coming and goings, interruptions and objections – all the responses that characterize free discussion. The quiet tread of feet and hollow ring of voices coming from a courtyard in the grey stillness of early morning, a chill, wet breeze from the Saronic Gulf, a holy philosopher, steaming in a swaddling of shaggy bedclothes, old men, grappling, straining in agony, red-faced and streaming sweat in a wrestling-match of ideas – such as constitute half the beauty of the Protagoras are almost entirely neglected in the Republic. Well they might be, for the Republic does not belong to any single time or place in the world, but is for and about all mankind.

Socrates and Glaucon go with Polemarchus from certain religious festivities to the latter's house, where they meet his brothers, Lysias and Euthydemus, and his old father, Cephalus. Thrasymachus, Charmantides and Cleitophon are visitors in the house. Socrates listens earnestly to Cephalus while conversing with him about old age, happiness and virtue, and when Cephalus must go attend to his religious duties his son Polemarchus inherits the argument. To him Socrates is exposing certain weaknesses in the conventional definitions of justice, when Thrasymachus interposes, the voice out of the whirlwind, lending, by his vehemence, a dramatic touch to the story which is heightened by his own heightening color, the first blush recorded on what one might well call a very brazen face.

Another event worthy of mention is Adeimantus' great speech in which he asks to know the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. This follows right on the episode of Thrasymachus.

A dramatic situation, which reveals the humanism of Socrates, is arrived at when the party finds that, led by Socrates, it has driven the definition of justice to bay. It is a thrilling description Socrates gives of drawing the net around the wily prey; his imagination makes exciting business of the hunt for truth.

The major irregularity in the discussion is Socrates' diversion, on popular demand, from the pursuit of justice to a dissertation on matrimony in the state, which he gives only after grave misgivings.

Other occurrences in the account of the conversation will be mentioned in the following treatment of the phases of the discussion. Be it enough to say that during the lengthy treatment of marriage and philosophy in the state Glaucon and Adeimantus are the answerers, the "yes men" whose seemingly glib comprehension and absolutely definite "yes" and "no" are disturbing to the reader, who feels to thank Adeimantus for protesting that the answers are not given with perfect understanding.

C. 1. The Problems: "Given"

The aim of Socrates in following a long and hard course of thought (though he often protests the tediousness of thought, I don't think it wearied him a bit) is to get desired information on a subject. To get anywhere he must have certain materials given him to work with from the start. A problem in geometry, philosopher's twin sister, is always prefaced by a "given": what is given here?

Socrates starts out with the knowledge that what he is seeking exists. He does not know but what it is a compound, that is the emergence of a number of different things, but he early finds it to be an element. He takes the existence of Happiness and virtue as the does that of justice, for granted. These things are "given" from the outset and accepted without question

Plato's search is also ours; what of this elementary fact, the existence of justice? Christianity, acknowledging the existence of justice says "sin not!"; and acknowledging the futility of understanding justice says, in the same breath and with the same feeling, "judge not!" "He alone is just," and yet the same He "cannot look upon sin with the least degree of allowance." There could be no plainer assertion that man knows that justice exists and recognizes it on sight, but has not the faintest idea as to what it is. But it would seem that the justice or injustice of a thing depends on the state of mind of the individual: one of the pivotal points of Christian theology, as well as Hebrew, indeed the key-note of all religion is justification – the business of being just (justified, without stain) and on a par with all other just things no matter what one's behavior might have been. The indolence of man neglects the dictates of necessity, which are often hard – "the words of the wise are as goads and as nails well loaded, etc." – but still is not willing to forego the advantages which he knows might have been his, so resorts to all kinds of symbolical acts, imploring the giver of all blessings to tell him what to do. The Giver, knowing that we cannot understand justice demands absolute obedience – he will get us out of it, He knows what is best for us to do to be saved; only one person renders obedience in all things, that one will help the rest of us. "Obedience is better than sacrifice" and knowledge better than both, but knowledge comes first after this life when "we shall see him as he is" and with him all other things as they are. But obedience, knowledge and sacrifice, all are means to the same end – to know what should be done under the given circumstances.

Science works with that same information as its ultimate end – what should be done. Its basis for action is knowledge, which is empirical knowledge. It acknowledges the existence of justice. It differs from religion on the matter in that Nature judges instead of God – she rewards and punishes with perfect justice, whereas in religion there is some talk of mercy, whatever that is, claiming her own, tempering, but not robbing, justice. I think it is now sufficiently understood that justice exists and also that every normal man is in a position to know what is just and what is unjust. I know that tomatoes exist; I know a tomato when I see it and I can tell with infallible accuracy what is a tomato and what is not, but for all that, I do *not* know what a tomato is. So let it be with justice.

The ancient Greeks were also much alive to justice. Many are the impressive tales of the dealings of men and cities with each other – of broken trust or moving fidelity and their rewards. The awful sentence ("the child of an oath, without hands or feet" carries it out) pronounced by the oracle on the tyrant Glaucon, who refused to give the Miletians their money back when it was due them, is typical of those every popular tales which prove that it pays to be fair, but only move the hearer with a deep admiration for the noble soul, by which he acknowledges that it is "good" to be just. This keen feeling for the fine and good provides the intense color and feeling which characterises tales of the days of chivalry; gallantry and villany move us as nothing else does – it was such a story that sent King David into a passionate rage against the evil-doer of the parable.

Plato's greatest help in solving his problem is what might be called the unwritten law of the parable. I was astounded on first reader Spencer's "First Principles" at the way in which that thinker would apply without hesitation a principle discovered in one field of science to all others. Finding a "first principle," let us say the "rhythm of motion" in the constant waving and fanning motion of a submarine grass, he promptly applies the "law" to language, astronomy, biology, sociology or whatever else it suits. He never bothers to explain by what right he does this; he never tells why fluctuation in the stock market not only represents but actually is the same oscillating motion as that of the sea grass. Nor does one question the validity of the most far-reaching connections; somehow they seem all right. Human beings are completely satisfied with the parable, it is the only way by which anything can be taught, the unknown must be represented in terms of the known; every mathematical symbol is as much a symbol as the cross or swastika, every word is a little parable. Plato puts great trust in the efficacy of his parallels. "We can read small letters better after practicing on large," he says, and enters into an extensive analogy of the state and individual. The only difference between the State and the "city within" is one of *size*.

The atom, our lunar system, the solar system, systems of stars, from the simple binaries as the wonderful Castor to the great congregations in Hercules and the Centaur; clusters in a system, as the Double Cluster in Perseus, systems within a greater, as in the Magellan Clouds or our Milky Way, and so ad infinitum, everything a replica of everything else, "all things have their likeness" and distinguished from one another only by their relative magnitudes. So Christ says "the Father is greater than I," making it clear again and again that his will is not the Father's, and yet "he was in the express image of the Father" and who hath seen him hath seen the Father, all of which makes him God on a smaller scale, while he would that we should be saviours on a smaller scale: – "I in the Father, and ye in me," "is it not written in your law, ye are all gods?," "be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect ....be ye holy, for I am holy."

Such a scale system Plato uses. It can be expressed thus: the principles (beasts, etc.) and forms of the soul: (are to) the individual :: the individual :: the city :: the city: is to the world (Hellas). The concept was not carried further, because it was not thought necessary to the *end*.

With the knowledge of the existence of justice, and of man's ability to recognize it, and being allowed the use [of] parables or the "scale system," what is to be found?

C. 2. The Problems: "To Find"

"Our aim in founding the State was the greatest happiness of the whole, which can be attained when we know "how life can be most profitably spent by each of us." Two facts are true of every act: it is characterized by the degree of justice in which it is done, being just, unjust or both, and 2. by the degree of wisdom in which it is done. An act is wise in proportion as it is useful, i.e., as its results make for happiness. But we cannot be sure of the ultimate effect of any of our acts, "the best-laid plans of man and beast" will always fail to consider any number of those vastly complex and confusing influences which shape our destinies. Of one thing alone we are sure – one thing alone can always be determined by us, and that is whether an act is to be just or unjust. Now, we have a reason for supposing that some definite connection, even perhaps a proportion, may exist between wisdom and justice – the voice of justice tells us what we *ought to*

do, and that is exactly what the “voice of wisdom” would tell us if we could hear it as we do that of justice. The great question is would wisdom (NECESSITY), if we could understand it, tell us that we ought to do something different from what justice commands? If not, then it is sufficient that we know the just course of action, for it is then identical with the wise one. But if the dictates of the two should be different, what profiteth a man his knowledge of justice? With wisdom we have the opposite situation from our relationship with justice: we know what wise is but we do not know what is wise! Wisdom is knowledge of cause and effect, knowing what to do to achieve certain results – it is the knowledge of the consequences of our actions by which those actions may be regulated to produce an ultimate “fulness of joy.” So knowing so much of our relationship to wisdom and justice, we have in the proportion:

nature of wisdom : nature of justice :: the wise act : the just act
A B a b

“A” and “b” known. We wish *to find* “a”, the wise act, which makes for the greatest happiness of the whole and which represents the most profitable expenditure of energy possible. This, by the law of proportion, we cannot do until the other unknown, “B” is given, after which the solution will be very easy. It is the aim of the Republic to find what “B” is: that holds the key to happiness. Truly “justice is a piece of gold worth the search!”

To find justice, two things must be known of it. First, what it is, and then its relationship – its ratio to wisdom, the which can be determined only with a knowledge of its advantages and disadvantages, for wisdom is 100% advantageous, and by representing the advantageousness of a thing we are representing that thing in terms of wisdom. This is what must be known of “B.”

What is justice? We have seen that it is identified in the public mind with square-dealing – rendering every man his dues – “to Caesar that which is Caesar’s,” as it is most effectively expressed. So with the Greeks, who took it more or less for granted that justice is the paying of a debt in the broader sense. Socrates shows the definition of Simonides to be unsatisfactory: it adheres only under special conditions, i.e. when the receiver of the sum is in a normal condition of mind and the money by coming into his hands will not cause mischief.

The thought suggests that doing mischief to one’s self might be truly unjust; but how about doing evil to one’s enemies? Does one not thereby do good to one’s self, and is this not justice? This was another stock idea of the times. My enemy, when he improves, becomes less my enemy, trained in conflict he is more my enemy. In doing evil to him, therefore, I am making him not better but worse and spoiling my own case to boot. “The injury of another can be in no case just.” Already one can see how injustice is approaching wisdom – these acts are unjust because they have a negative effect; they are to the detriment of someone, and for this same reason they are unwise, causing an increase of pain, a decrease of happiness. But as yet the effects of the act on the doer are not fully established.

Whatever the results of an act to doer and recipient, they are always, when just, to the advantage of the stronger of the two, affirms Thrasymachus, announcing that mankind censure injustice, fearing to suffer it rather than to commit it. But that justice is the interest of the stronger is, like the idea of the paying of a debt as justice, applicable only under special

conditions, and therefore not an entirely satisfactory definition. To prove this, Socrates says, with Thrasymachus unwillingly agreeing, that as the obedience of subject to a ruler is just, and yet this justice is not always in the interest of the ruler, justice can only be in the interest of the stronger when the stronger knows what is best to command for himself.

Great royal absolutism, the interest of the stronger, is as a rule built up not on the commands of the ruler, but by some great minister or assistant to the king. Thus the greatest absolutism in the western world, that of Louis XIV, proves Socrates' point. Sully, Richelieu, Mazarin were in a better position to know what was good for their kings than the kings themselves; while to complete the illustration, it was the personal command of the king, at a time when he did his own advising, that brought the country and himself to ruin, and that not because the king was stupid, but because, blinded by the glory of his Rococo heaven, he was not in a position to see things as they are.

But Thrasymachus explains (at a kindly hint from Socrates) that in commanding for his ill, the stronger automatically ceases to be the stronger, an argument, which applied to God, as ceasing to be God, was a great bone of contention in the early church. To this Socrates rejoins with the claim, which Thrasymachus admits, that a ruler is only a ruler when he is ruling, that is, prescribing for the interest of those under him, and by this it is clear that justice is in the interest of those weak ones. Such a doctrine, the ideal of an Alfred, is opposed by the logic of a Machiavelli when Thrasymachus reminds that the shepherd is not thinking of the pleasure experienced by his sheep in their being fed and sheltered, nor of the joy of their owner, his master, but, in the latter end, only of his own prosperity. If justice is the obedience of the shepherd to the nobler dictates of his soul, such dictates leading him he knows not where, then justice is sublime simplicity, not vice. On the other hand injustice is merely discretion – also not vice. Thrasymachus having made such a claim might be asked, "What is vice, if it has nothing to do with justice and injustice?" To which the reply that an act has no moral, but only a practical significance, would be the statement of one of Socrates' own doctrines – the good and beautiful is the useful. It is on this common ground that Socrates catches Thrasymachus by showing that he who deals unjustly deals unwisely. To do this, Socrates makes the rather disconcerting statement that the wise man would not wish to do or say more than any other wise man. "That what other wise man?" we might ask, for Plato knows that no two men are wise in exactly the same degree. It is the identification of knowledge with wisdom that makes the statement possible, for Socrates has just said that a musician, for example, is *wise* in that he *knows* music. Must there then be a limit set to knowledge of music, which many may reach but none surpass? That is not Plato's meaning: wisdom, it had been shown before this, is one of four virtues – an elementary principle which characterizes every act either by its presence or the presence of it opposite. Two musicians are both wise, if one of them were to have more wisdom than the other, his knowledge would be something more than, which is something else than – something apart from the wisdom of the other. Anything apart from wisdom is its opposite, for wisdom is an absolute thing, being subject to no quantitative measurement but only remarked by its presence or absence – the presence of its opposite.

So Socrates finds that justice is wise and advantageous before he really knows what justice is. He goes farther in showing that injustice renders the state or the individual incapable of action because it prohibits unity – the unjust state is one of sedition and distraction, the unjust man is not at unity with himself. No matter how unjust, how steeped in antiquity a man or state

becomes, both will always be *justified*. Hence the strange rites and ordinances of antiquity; the people make their own golden calf, they heap them up preachers for their itching ears, "they prophesy falsely and my people love to have it so." Every nation, whatever part it played in the war will be cleared of any "war guilt," when other methods fail a nation can always find a suitable scapegoat to bear whatever stains its policy might have brought upon its name. So it is with the individual, "wouldst not play false, and yet wouldst wrongly win." It is interesting to note how all of Shakespeare's great "villains," "guilty ones" from the justified Brutus to the profoundly devilish Iago, given speeches of justification in which the inward strife is evidenced, which discord is the true note of tragedy, the gallons of blood spilt being merely a theatrical gesture.

The gods are just, admits Thrasymachus, "order is the first law of heaven." How expressive the titles of "the evil one," "lord of misrule," "the father of confusion," whose principal business is to "confound" the work of God! If you are unjust, you are an enemy to the gods, another advantage is being just. If you are a friend of the gods, you must be good.

So justice is wiser, is better and is abler than injustice. Along with this, Thrasymachus is obliged to admit that justice is the excellence, injustice the defect of the soul. By the parable of the pruning hook, etc., is shown that the criteria by which the excellence of anything is judged is usefulness. If he has this usefulness of soul, his thoughts and actions will be more effective, will go further toward achieving his ends than those of the unjust man, that is, he will *live better*. Living better, he must be happier, and is not happiness that last authority on the advantageousness of a thing?

After all this has been agreed upon, Glaucon still wants to form a more real estimate of the life of the just and unjust, for there is no denying that for all our philosophizing something seems wrong. After he had so gallantly championed justice for some eleven chapters, even the redoubtable Jeremiah is puzzled: "Let me talk with thee of thy judgements, O Lord: Wherefore doth way the of the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they *happy* that deal very treacherously?" So Glaucon presents, not as his own, but as the general attitude to justice the idea that evil is greater than good, that they who deal justly do so against their will and that, all in all, the life of the unjust man really is the better. He proceeds to tell about this unjust man – a perfectly unjust man, compared with a perfectly just one. To be perfectly unjust one must be clever, perfectly clever. It takes a great man to be a really great villain, there are innumerable wretches whose acts are as depraved as they can make them, but they are not bright enough to do anything much. All that is necessary to the ultimate achievement – "the golden round" – is the intelligence, courage and unscrupulousness to "catch the nearest way." That has been shown time and again in the course of history. Glaucon would well have known the cases Zopyrus, Astayges, Darius – any number of rulers of that time who employed such methods as recommended by the great tyrant (I think it was Polycratus) who walked silently before the stupid messengers of the young king who had sent for his advice into a field of wheat, where he spotted and uprooted all the tallest and most vigorous ears of grain. And were not such men certainly the most successful and influential – the masters of all the rest?

The above observation is strengthened by Adeimantus' presently pointing out we all behave ourselves with an eye single to the attainment of selfish means. No one thinks it is wrong that children should receive a careful upbringing to the end that they might "be somebody" –

well married, of high repute, financially and socially influential. Is this not the motive of the tyrant? We would all be tyrants if we could. Only the weak, those definitely out of the running, blame injustice. Adeimantus further announces that the reason for people's calling success power and glory and thereby finding it at odds with justice , is that from the beginning poets and all writers have insisted on speaking of this success in terms of the "benefits, glories, and honors" which a person receives. If such is happiness, the "he who taketh a city" is truly happy. Today we still insist, and more than ever, that he who has BY ANY MEANS become notorious has arrived! "Proclaimed by millions" "fifty million people can't be wrong," today, it is the journalist and advertised who propagate such warped ideas of "success" in the public mind. Poets have assumed a minor role, but with them it is still the same story – fame is greatness and greatness is fame and this is success, being in most cases proportionate to box office receipts or royalties. When someone is proclaimed great today, it is by newspapers, of course, but alas! it is only natural that newspapers should judge everything by their own criteria of worth – popularity. It behooves us as closely as Adeimantus to pay strict attention to what Plato says about the "true and essential nature of justice and injustice, abiding in the soul," and NOT in connection with what people are prone to look upon as success. The question here is what have justice and injustice on the possessor? What essential good and evil do they work within him? How would it be with him if there were no public? After all, we live and die quite alone. For my part it is rarely that, exploring the regions of thought, I have caught sight of another person, and if I have seen him, he has never yet seen me – most of the time, it's a person who has died long ago, leaving to posterity that most eloquent of fossils, a book, form which I can draw much, but to which, and this is quite as important, I can impart nothing. We must exchange ideas something like the Carthaginians and the Lybians: the Carthaginians would leave their goods on the seashore and, withdrawing a great distance out to sea in their ships, would wait until the Lybians, after having looking over the wares, had laid by them the amount of silver sufficient they would take it (in the meantime, during their sojourn ashore, the Lybians had hid themselves inland) if not, they would go out to sea again and wait until the Lybians had signaled that they had brought more silver. So I take from you exactly what I please, and you, neglecting my enthusiastic contributions, take from me often what I had no idea of giving. To observe and measure justice in the dealings between parties is out of the question – all our experiments must take place within one mind. As conducive to the greatest happiness of the whole the felicity of many minds, it is still regarded as working within a unity, producing as it is the greatest happiness not of the *many* but of the *whole*.

At this stage of the argument it is necessary to know more about the nature of justice, for though we have good reason to believe that justice has a good effect on the mind, we do not know just how much of that which is producing a desired effect is justice – it may be justice and something else, justice having really influence, or there may be a great complexity of influences of which justice is one, or justice may itself be the emergence of other things and not an element at all.

At the outset, many confusing possibilities can be eliminated if justice be excluded from the class of good to which they belong. There are three classes of goods: those desirable in themselves alone, independent of the effect – harmless pleasures and enjoyments (I personally do not believe such a class exists; to me, the more trifling a thing is, the more tragic the loss of what might have been, being as real as the acquirement of what is), secondly, those which provide

present joy and whose effects are also pleasant, such as knowledge and health, and lastly, those which are hard, but lead to reward.

The point Glaucon and Adeimantus wish to make in their speeches mentioned above, is that the general idea of justice is that it belongs to the third class. "The hard is good" is one of the best known Greek proverbs. I too, have said that the dictates of necessity are often hard, that "the words of the wise are as goads." The business of taking up one's cross does not have to be hard; it becomes a fearful task only if it is shirked or postponed, and justice requires not only that certain things be done, but that they be done in a certain way, by which way they are made easy. Christ would agree with Socrates that justice is not only desirable for its effects, but that it is pleasant now, for he says (to some an inconsistent saying from one "who bears our loads") "My yoke is easy, and my burden is light." The world is right in thinking that justice is hard; for the world it *is* hard. I know a young man who does the most appalling handsprings; he says it is easy; I say it is hard, and we are *both* right. So, in a way, both Socrates and Glaucon are right, but as to perfect justice, justice in itself, only Socrates is right, for the perfectly just act is not merely the doing of a thing, but just as much the doing it in the just, that is the *pleasant* way. Whatever justice is, it must be something which is desirable all the time, for itself and for the things which can be attained by it.

Such a thing would, by definition, be a *virtue* – a thing of absolute and constant worth. In investigating the nature of the state (to be described later) it is found that there are four such qualities: they are forms of virtue, or virtues. Wisdom, courage, temperance and justice are the "elements" which characterize everything by their presence or absence, and are recognized by the happiness they produce. Plato gives no more virtues. If we know whereby a thing is wise, then we can see what wisdom is. If we eliminate any three of the characteristic virtues of an act, whatever qualities remain by which the act might be characterized are the facts by which the fourth exists, because the whole act must be completely accounted for by these four virtues alone.

Wisdom, as has been seen, is knowledge – *knowledge* of the principles of cause and effect – the "good in counsel" (that is knowing what the occasion necessitates – counseling what should be done to achieve certain ends) Socrates calls the truly wise.

Courage is the saving power – that which saves the ideal; it is the act of guiding one's behavior along a course true to the North Star or an ultimate desire without compromising to anything which encumbers, impedes or detracts one's progress. Courage is a sense of values. Paul starts preaching to the heathen with "fear and trembling," but though he knows they can hurt him he also knows that a worse fate awaits him if he does what Jonah did. It can be truly said that the prophets who were stoned did that which was most cowardly in them – they obeyed commands of the one they most feared, or rather, they did the act they least feared to do, taking the course of least resistance all the way through. Courage, then, is like wisdom, *knowledge* – knowledge of the outcome plus opinion regarding the desirability of two actions. The *act*, in accordance with this knowledge is impulsive and automatic and not a virtue. (I once, to illustrate to myself that faith and works are identical, announced to a roomful of people that the house in which they were sitting was on fire. All reacted differently to the announcement, and the degree of credence each had given my warning was evidence *automatically* by his or her actions.)

Temperance is a sort of harmony achieved by "the rule of the better part over the worse." The worse is in this case the animal, or unreasoning part which does not guide itself by principles of cause and effect but only by appetite. If it *knew* what the result of its actions would be, as it knows that by catching a rabbit it can fill its stomach, the animal would behave very differently than it does. Knowledge and reason are inseparable: Plato unites them in the term "wisdom"; the animal has no wisdom because it has no knowledge to speak of; that which is knowledge in it, by which gets its food may be called arbitrarily wisdom, or reason, which defending its young in the face of a personal danger which it understands is truly courage. We must not forget that man, a glorified animal, is still an animal, and when we speak of the animal as the perfectly unreasoning principle, we speak of an ideal which can only be found in the same sphere as perfect justice. What we choose to call *the* animal (that is, the animal "laid up in heaven") is characterized by, or rather, its essence is a *perfect* lack of knowledge. This makes temperance, the resistance or opposition to the perfect animal, a form of *knowledge*.

The knowledge by which an act is undertaken (wisdom) has been found. The knowledge by which it is sustained from changing to something else, i.e. its course (courage) has been found. The knowledge by which its speed is regulated, i.e. by which it is suppressed and controlled has been found. Comparing the course of the individual through time with that of a body through space we have 1. the inciting, 2. the sustaining and 3. the controlling force. All are forms of knowledge, all are forms of knowledge which like Thales' loadstone, attracts things to it. One thing is failing: what if these three courses of action led in different directions? There has been as yet nothing by which one might not suppose that the three could form a unit or rigidity – a static, unprogressive form. If courage is to be our North Star, what is to hinder wisdom from twinkling in the south? We have attracting forces indeed, but they are effective in proportion as their action is in the same direction. It will take a fourth force to induce the three streams of power into one channel, and to keep them there. Or say, rather, this force is the channel itself, the deepest valley of all, which sooner or later draws all streams to it. This must be justice – the ordering principle, the business of exerting all one's efforts along one line and one line only. It is that "singleness of heart" which like a burning glass, if is of noticeable greatness – no larger than the palm of your hand, upon which you think the sun shines "nothing to speak of," is yet capable of producing even feeble sources immense effect. The minding of one's own business is justice.

In order to do one thing only, I just KNOW exactly what is to the point and what is not, and how much so. Justice is the *knowledge* of one thing – knowing it so well as to tell infallibly the relationship in which all things stand to it and in which it stands to all things.

It is evident by now that, as each of the forms of virtue are forms of knowledge, VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE. Returning to the proportion A:B::a:b, it is now evident that wisdom and knowledge are the same thing, the just act, is sure enough the wise act. Perfect wisdom, perfect courage, perfect temperance, perfect, justice, all are summed up in perfect knowledge. Inversely, the nearer we get to perfect knowledge the nearer we are to the virtues – they can be acquired only as knowledge (the stuff of which they are formed) and knowledge can only be acquired and given as and by *education*. So, after all is said, education is the means of securing the greatest happpiness of the state or the individual.

In treating the nature of real and ideal states and men, Socrates 1 - discovers much of the information given above, 2. tests and substantiates claims already made, and 3 - determines definitely on how we should go about – how life should be passed by each of us – procuring the greatest happiness of the whole.

Necessity is the true creator of the state. Whatever is, is because it must be, i.e. by necessity. It seems paradoxical that Plato's state whose mother is necessity, should differ profoundly from other states, whose mother is also necessity – the same necessity. Can the parent of a drove of simpletons and monsters be expected to bear the perfect child?

The perfect state is not going to be developed from a depraved germ. The amazing and motley brood of that perfectly matched couple, Cause and Effect, must represent the demoralization, on the contrary, of what were all perfect germs. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump" only when the parts of the lump respond to its activity. So with the offspring of the "Must Bes," they cannot be bad by nature: there must have been a leaven somewhere to which they responded. The public is a participant in every event that effects it. Socrates shows that it is man's nature to seek the good. It must be his ignorance alone which leads him away from it. In an ignorant world, necessity produces stupid men, and states in a knowing world, wise ones. What is the leavening principle? The law that things must progress or deteriorate. Whereby does man let it ruin his happiness? By laziness. The universal law of variation will be his undoing unless he learns the significance of his situation, for that law says he must change. But who shall say in what direction he will develop? Who is the creator of laziness? The answer, as far as we know, can only lie within the man. Necessity says "keep moving," but it seems to lie in the will of man which way he will go.

If that is so, every event in history can be accounted for with no trouble. Yet one cannot help thinking, with Schopenauer: that though we do what we will, we cannot will what we do; that is, our will is also the product of necessity. Whether this is so has not yet been determined with finality. Plato solves the question by allowing the existence of every state by necessity and providing that the ideal state already exists. As surely as this state exists, it is *the* state, par excellence. If another thing should exist, it is either the state or it is not the state – it must either be perfect AS A STATE or not exist at all, for the existence of THE state is identical with perfection – its essence is perfection. Either wind is the North wind or it is not a North wind at all, it may be a north-northeast wind, but for all that, as long as it does not come directly from the north it is, in the strict sense of the word, no more a North wind than is the South wind. So, by STATE, one means STATE, and a thing if is a "half state" is another form of existence. I am no more my brother than that chair in the corner is! Thus, aside from *the* state, no state really exists. A carpenter may make a bed, says Plato, but it is not a real bed, for it is bound to have peculiarities which no other bed has. Why do we call it a bed? There must be a prototype, a true bed somewhere, otherwise we would be justified in calling a table a bed. The perfect bed exists, or we would not be able to call one thing a bed and another not a bed, but where does it exist? It exists, to be sure, in the perfect state – is slept in, we might say, by the perfect man. Vague as that may seem it is none the less true, that bed not only actually exists, but it is the ONLY bed in existence!

But on this earth, nothing is perfect. Achilles had his vulnerable heel, Siegfried that little flaw of human weakness in the center of his vast back – it is significant that the fate of all great epics lies in one little weakness – in the Nibelungenlied the gods lose their eternal Spring-time just because one bright eye of the maiden is seen through the pile of treasure that otherwise covers her (upon one out of twelve apostles hangs the greatest of all dramas); one little plant alone is overlooked in soliciting oaths of good-will to Balder the Beautiful. So it goes – in the words of a nursery rhyme (often the fossilized remains of great schools of primitive thought) "...the kingdom was lost, and all for want of a horseshoe nail." On this earth where things are made of man, as the main doctrine of the influential Origenes has it, "where fallen spirits are chained and fettered to material things as a punishment for their wickedness, angels and demons alike, things are dictated strictly by necessity. Fortunately necessity deals alike with all like stuff, that is a principle upon which we can rely, but unfortunately, perfectly like materials do not exist.

Plato gives as the first voice of necessity the call of an empty stomach. The French human geographist, Jean Bruhnes, says that the first necessity is shelter. The writer (I – none other) has spent much of his time alone in strange places, as primitive man often did, and can vouch for the truth of the claim. Plato had evidently not had the experience to acquaint him with the first form of necessity! He does not realize that sleep is not only an inexorable master as is hunger, but a violently brutal one, as he soon learns who knows that much depends on his keeping awake when sleep is on nature's program. The terror of sleep is a very real one: primitive man soon learned that asleep he is in as helpless a condition as an infant, nay, as an infant bound hand and foot, blindfolded, gagged, thrown in a well, hung up in a closet, or what you will! The dog stomps himself, as it is explained, a "hole" in the tall grass whenever he retires; man, barricaded behind always more blankets than he needs, is still liable once in a while to night qualms: a sudden awakening in an unearthly confusion, sweating and trembling with terror; none of the objects in the room have their wanted familiarity, a moment of epical distress, and in the morning all is forgotten, as if it were really the experience of another world. It is with some truth that a recent popular work on religion began with the words, "In the beginning was fear." Neolithic dwellings, barricaded caves, treetops, lacustrine villages, pueblos, walled cities – all are an evidence of the same master of man-sleep. Is it not striking that today the private house is as much a castle as it ever was? Is it not amazing to think, as we go around locking the doors at night, that we are doing just what our ancestors of half a million years ago did upon retiring, and from exactly the same motives! That is the most venerable and primitive of all human customs, and Plato does well to banish the key, that symbol of fear and bondage, from his community of guardians.

As man has many wants, Plato rather surprisingly starts out with a "city" of 4 or 5 men – all specialists, thereby giving his state the ideal form at the outset. Husbandmen, builder, weaver, shoemaker, smith, shepherd, transporter; in such order new professions are introduced into the new state to provide for its growth. Retailers of "middlemen," the weak in body, and hirelings with weak heads and strong bodies complete the list.

In his beautiful description of rural life, Plato is still idealizing, a fortunate privilege, yet we are free to question, is there such a thing as an ideal rural life? Attempts to see a source of pleasure for the farmer in the contemplation of the picturesque nature of his life are deserving of

such fitting dispraisal as George Crabbe or Thomas Gray bestowed upon the soft-living Shenstone and his kind. After all is said and done, only a philosophic and understanding enthusiast see beauty in farming, the average peasant is not likely to have the mental makeup of Hesiod, Cato, Ahab, George III, or Diocletian. The drudgery of work upon the land has presented the greatest stumbling block to all Utopians.[1] Plato would have been infinitely grateful for such an easy way out of the peasant problem, the source of greatest embarrassment in providing happiness for all, as presents itself to us today. We have machines to do our dirty work. Recently a work, "The Twilight of the American Mind," (W. B. Pitkin) has pointed out that we do not know how to use these machines. Its main theme is a plea for us to forget "that the hard is good." Aptly enough, this gets its inspiration from Plato, starting with a quotation from the Republic. Our improved farm implements and methods, above all things, says Mr. Pitkin, are making for a (second-class) paradise in America.

The city continuing to grow would become the hatchery of great fortunes, and, by the laws of human nature, must accommodate luxury. Moreover, increased population would demand broader and broader fields to feed it, and Plato anticipates Malthus by many centuries in finding in this necessity the primary cause of war. Plato's state is not situated in such a peculiarly advantageous land as Moore's; it is in Greece, and the deliberate avoidance of thinking of any conditions beyond the control of man as ideal – the location of the city in a very real and unchanged Greece, would hint that Plato is already considering the actual working out of his plan. In coming into contact and dispute with other communities, the city is confronted with foreign problems, and an army becomes necessary.

Thus, by necessity the state is formed. The institutions which spring into being will be treated separately. But necessity, mated with ignorance, produces, as we have seen, a great variety of offspring. Including the ideal state, we have five principal forms of government, and of the soul. It must not be forgotten that whenever Plato speaks of the state, he is speaking for the soul, for a very complete analogy exists between them, and "equals may be substituted for equals in any operation."

Of these five forms of state, the best is that which corresponds to the best and noblest soul; that would be an aristocracy, the form of government of Plato's ideal state to which most of the discussion is devoted. Next in worth is the government of Sparta, closely resembling that of Crete where Lycurgus is said to have got it (Plutarch). To what kind of man does this correspond? Plato evolves the meaner state from the nobler one. So it would seem that before there can be a timocracy, an aristocracy must exist, that before an oligarchy were possible there must have been a timocracy, and so on, in seeming reversal of all ideals of progressive evolution. Are we to assume that evil thus springs out of good or that governments are perfect in proportion to their primitiveness? It is here that the greatness of Plato is manifest; in direct contradiction to all that one would "naturally" expect, he explains the origin of each of the forms of government by processes which have been strikingly confirmed since his day. He must have based his observations on Herodotus, a knowledge of which alone, says Schopenhauer, is sufficient acquaintance with the entire field of history.

[1] It was the great undoing of the American Utopia of Emerson's day.

First the Spartan timocracy. The "syndeipnon," the freedom of women, the rigorous training of youth – enjoining dignified and courageous behavior on those from whom we today tolerate and expect childish behavior, the simplicity and wholesomeness of food, all speak well for Spartan civilization, as does the very real influence of the Cretan musician, Thaletas, whose exhortations to unity and concord "breathed" a spirit of calm and order." The fact that such idealistic institutions persisted for generations proves their practicability. If such a noble experiment had not gone hand in hand with such horribly intemperate rites as the krypteia, in which sons of the citizens were allowed free rein in an all-night persecution of the helots every year, who knows but what the ideal state might have been realized in Sparta? The timocracy is borne of and inferior to the aristocracy. How and why?

If ever in the past men had achieved a perfect state its existence was bound to be short. That is because agents of discord are constantly being introduced into any society by birth. Plato's ideal state is built up of people who are born just right. To be born just right requires more than superior or even perfect parents, like the four classes of human blood, parents may be in themselves entirely satisfactory but only certain specific types can combine well. So, until we know the laws by which parents should be mated, but above all the times and seasons at which children should be born, and this depends on the knowledge of a complex numerical system which, according to Plato, we will never be able to understand, we cannot expect a perfect citizenry in our state. Those souls born out of season are brass and iron; they don't harmonize with well-born natures. As there is friction between them and the gold and silver ones, there is a general understanding – a "compromise," only after the stronger, be they gold or iron, have suppressed the weaker to form a society halfway between an oligarchy and an aristocracy – a state in which great honors are given to rules, warriors abstaining from agriculture and trades, gymnastics and military drill the major themes of education, in short, the result will be a Sparta.

Through intermarriage, pure natures have ceased to exist; all are alloys. At the time Plato announced this, certain Aryan tribes far to the north were living in a truly savage state, but at that time already were forming into organized social systems (V.G. Childe, J.L. Meyers). Their government, being inseparable from cult, was as near to an aristocracy as any the world has seen. The theory of blood sacrifice, as practiced by the people of antiquity, calls for the immolation of no inferior person, but specifically of that one who was the most perfect in all things among the people. There is strong evidence for believing that in the earliest stages of Egyptian monarchy the king was sacrificed in the thirtieth year of his reign, a festival long preserved in Egyptian custom (Bakie). But whether the victim was always a ruler or not is not to the point, but what concerns us is the first fact that among primitive races from Mesopotamia (where Abraham was a candidate for sacrifice) and even the Far East to western Europe where the victim (usually annual) was reverenced as a god before his death and after, his slightest wish religiously observed (perhaps the modern "Henkersmahlzeit," a hold-over) a serious effort was being made to find the worthiest, i.e., the best person in society, and that upon these persons being located this person was given divine esteem, his words obeyed as oracles (Frazer: the words of the king were oracles) and that this person often ruled society. Such a system allows for the existence of a true aristocracy.

Seeking an example for the origin of a timocracy as explained by Plato, we shall concern ourselves here only with the Germans. Observing this literal aristocracy existing at the dawn of

European civilization, we are not surprised to find at that time, as at all times, inferior characters among the people. The presence of such would imply the doom of aristocracy, but timocracy does not automatically set in with their very existence; they are not in a position to assert themselves in such a community of idealists as superstition has made (strange as it may seem, superstition is the nearest thing to certain knowledge). The blood sacrifice became too expensive to maintain on the old scale. It ceased to be annual affair was eventually performed by proxy, an ox, sheep or, among some people (the Scythians, I think) a pig, or by the offering of an effigy, the ancestor of our ginger-bread man and hot-cross bun (Hermann Paul). As sacrifice thus grew to be a less life-and-death affair, the victim's old place was first taken in the public esteem by the man of war, the strongest and often the cleverest, whose person, as is well-known, was sacred – the thing to which alone the soldier rendered devotion. He maintained his position by means of his war-like capacity. This was still a form of aristocracy, and the idea is preserved down through Beowulf to the Table-Round.

Then war became the natural course of man's life. It had not always been. No people were ever more peace-loving than the Black Earth people of the Danube, if we are to believe V. Gordon Childe (*The Dawn of Civilization in Europe*) who would date the long and terrible story of strife in Europe which takes us down to the present-day form the invasion of a certain Bell-Beaker folk at a comparatively late time. It became, as Plato "prophecies," a disgrace for the warrior to work; in fact, so scrupulously did men shun the fields that Klemen insists that women alone were thought fit to practice an occupation whose aim was to encourage fertility and cause the land to bring forth in abundance. To this day the usage is seen all over Europe. (I think it significant that whereas all spring and summer ten women are to be seen in the fields of the Palatinate to every man, the harvesting is nearly all done by men: the time of fertilization is over.)

Lovers of wisdom as such, searchers after truth for its own sake, have no predominant place in the middle ages. Is the government that has been evolved from the ancient paganism really a timocracy? For one thing, manual labor is in disrepute. Hand in hand with that go, in Plato's timocracy, the peculiar honors given to rulers, also typical of the middle ages, when the Holy Roman Emperor could make or break kings twice as rich, powerful and clever as himself merely by virtue of his prestige. So it was with Sparta where the king had no other power to speak of but his immense prestige – one of his major rights was that the people *had* to go into official mourning on his death, give banquets in his honor, etc. The only education to which any

attention is paid, as Plato "predicts," is in gymnastics and the art of war, perfectly embodied in the chase and the joust.

But these things are also true of an aristocracy, the one difference being that now virtue is no longer desired for itself – it was relegated to a cloister, "put on the shelf" as it were – but that opulence is the thing desired. Plato describes in one paragraph the very essence of life in the middle ages: the lock and key principle, that overpowering tendency to lock persons and things up in strong boxes and indulge oneself in deliberate and utterly un-called for display. Plato says that these clever ones with such desires get the upper hand because philosophers are not sought for in a world where no one supposes that pure – that is, perfectly honest and devoted – philosophic natures are to be found. So men rise by cunning and unscrupulous design to form the great houses of the middle ages; the major-domo who is shrewd enough to attain the royal power is the one fit to rule. The analogy is complete in Plato's saying, "But one thing, and one thing only is predominantly seen," (we are here comparing the timocracy of medieval times with his theoretical timocracy, both have like origin) how closely do they resemble each other? "But one thing and one thing only is predominantly seen," says Plato, "The SPIRIT OF CONTENTION AND AMBITION; and these are due to the passionate or spirited element." The type of *man* that answers to timocracy – rough with slaves, courteous with his equals (they must be excellent indeed to be equal to him) a lover of power, a lover of honor, ruling because he is a valorous soldier; a lover of gymnastic and the chase – what could more perfectly sum up the character of the medieval noble? And in the bringing up of its offspring, the son of the noble, lies the great weakness and main threat of the timocracy. Proud of his father's virtues (he was nobody without a title) he is none the less drawn toward corruption by evil companions – he always, by virtue of his name and inheritance attacks hangers on – and ends up utterly bad, or if strong enough to assert himself against such influences, tyrannical, arrogant, and a law unto himself.

After men have been respected for their virtues, and then for their power, what is the next step? It is the respect for money as the symbol of both. Money rules in an oligarchy. But money is no new thing; even in the ideal Republic a token of exchange is necessary. Nor is money reverenced as such – poverty is regarded as an obstacle to whatever one wishes to accomplish, and indeed some money is indispensable; but human nature is not willing to specify a limit to wealth, *a saturation point*, which renders anything beneath it insufficient and anything beyond it an impediment. The insufficiency is always recognized – the impedimenta seldom if ever. The accumulation of great private fortunes is the death of timocracy. Men learn by experience or example that one needs be neither virtuous nor well-born to be influential (and poets, as we have seen, make fame identical with the blessedness). Capital rules. How often since the days of the Fuggers who had the throne of half the world to auction, has a royal family graciously accepted the terms of another family enjoying the absolutism without the vicissitudes and dangers of royal power!

The "system" of a double kingship reached full bloom in the last century. Marie Corelli's "Temporal Power" is a more full, but certainly not more accurate, exposition than Plato's. The miser and money-maker are the type which represent the oligarchy. This form of government precedes a democracy, according to the Republic. In America one might seen an inconsistency

with the doctrine: an oligarchy within a democracy, to which the reply that a government controlled by capital can be a democracy in name only.

Plato prefixes his discussion of democracy with the remark that "wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable extent." Wealth, however attained, begets extremes by producing a world in which only highly specialized types can survive. To save citing a lot of examples it is sufficient to say that the true ultimate state of one living in the influence of great riches is like that of the Roman Emperors, one of great wretchedness or, if he is of a great enough character to resist such an undoing, that character alone assures him great felicity. A common character would go to extremes of foolishness with wealth unless he were *extremely* stupid. So, however you look at it, it is the extreme type that survives to constitute a world of wealth. That remark about wealth and moderation is one of incalculable significance and worth for the modern world.

Every democracy is heralded by a revolution. Aristotle (Politics III) says oligarchy is first followed by tyranny and then comes democracy. This is true if oligarchy be regarded as aspiring tyranny, and it adheres with Plato's doctrine, for he says that oligarchy is the tyranny against which people are most likely to revolt, knowing that the "rulers" have not the peculiar rights of worth or name which men hold scared and which often justifies a tyrant in the full sense of the word. People revolt because of principles but *against persons*. Thus, though the French and English were in reality revolting against policies of royal absolutism as the first cause of their woes or fears, their action was against a quite innocent Louis XVI or Charles I, who personified something which they were not. Who, then, shall personify capital if its policies drive us to revolt? If we only knew then, as shown, we would not show the least hesitancy in adopting extreme measures against him, as we would in the case of one who ruled by law. That question has been anything but satisfactory in the great Russian revolution, and in Germany millions, ready to rise and proclaim their rights, are embarrassed as to whom they should rise against. Fastening the blame to a person is a lazy way to champion a cause, but it is (for that reason, one might say) the popular one. A large part of mankind has for centuries deplored whatever has gone wrong as the work of a certain fruit, responsible for bringing "death into the world and all our woes."

Plato's revolution is not the war of the people against the administration, but of the people against the people: "the state that falls sick is at war with herself." "Of what people against what people?" might be asked; "Why," the answer, "of any people against any people." Samson, guillotining at a merry rate on one day, is guillotined that next; 'off with his head,' screams Robespierre, or anyone else, and sure enough, off comes *his* head." Plato has struck twelve: not anyone in particular, but the whole state is sick, sick through and sick all over all at once. At any rate, democracy emerges from anarchy – a fool's paradise, the land of the free and the home of the knave.

One of the most striking things about a democracy is its forgiving spirit, its good-natured tolerance. The founders of this country did not expect that the notoriously lawless and even condemned would ever walk free and recognized in the streets, but such a condition as this which existed in Athens has come to be a familiar one in America – famous gangsters, racketeers and confirmed criminals of every sort resorting regularly to public places. Plato was in a

position to speak emphatically about democracies. We might question the assumption that democracy would have the same general character in all countries and at all times, yet we see in the description how the nature of the thing is the same yesterday, today, and forever. One divine characteristic of human nature, and one that will prove invaluable if we ever reach perfection, is that it changeth not, neither is there any shadow of change – if the paramecium acts on the same motive as the man, how could we well expect that the motives of one man should be very different from those of another? It behooves us to see what has gone before "to determine how life may be passed by each of us to the greatest advantage."

Above all, democracy is unsteadfast; its formative process can be reversed to make an oligarchy again by the efforts of a rich party, or a Napoleon may direct the course of events to produce a monarchy – almost anything can happen. How unperceived this democracy of ours has drifted into a dictatorship so absolute that every thought is rule – dictated, by what might be called advertisement. This is an example. In a monarchy the whims of men find expressions in festivals, or fashions of the court, or wars with outsiders. In a Democracy the letting off of steam is more than often a political gesture, affecting the actual organization of the state. This peculiar system, so bound up with the mind of the people, so sensitive to every whim of the fickle populace, has one pronounced advantage to the ultimate happiness of the whole, and that is freedom of the individual, whose great worth we hold to be self-evident. But this freedom is always for the individual to choose for himself what he would loathe and despise if someone else had chosen it for him. Thus the American colonists were driven into a revolution by measure taken by Lord North which gave them all they could or would or their own free wills had asked for. People object not to what is commanded, but to being commanded who is commanding. If that one should be anyone but themselves they immediately take offence. In short, a democracy as understood, or misunderstood by its members, is a kind of challenge to necessity – an attempt to throw off and disavow the absolute dictatorship of necessity. Necessity punishes a democracy.

Our ultimate immunity from perfection might in one word be assigned to indolence. They hymn-singing, cap waving, speech-giving democracy grows weary of its public burden, and of the necessity of eternal vigilance and initiative and sooner or later call for a Saul, Napoleon, or Charles. If the freedom-loving Greek had for a few short weeks drilled under Dionysius the Phocian as he promised to do, he stood the best chances for defeating the Persian fleet and saving Hellas. But after on e day of strenuous maneuvers in the hot sun, the Heros, almost to a man, expressed their determination rather to lie idle on the beach till the Persian came to, as they all knew, certainly enslave them, then practice rowing in the morning and hand-to-hand in the afternoon for a couple of weeks! Rather a passive slave, "feeling the safe walls of conformity around him," then maintaining an always precarious freedom. The world was hardly ready for a democracy when the high-blooded Acheans would so behave. Democracy is not the parent of meanness, crime or any kind of iniquity, but rather the grandparent, and that by her own child, indifference.

Things go so far in the democracy that "all things are just ready to burst with freedom." Remembering Mr. Lowell's sweet poem about every clod feeling a stir of might, one is impressed to vote that this last condition is just as it should be – everything ready to burst with freedom. It is a point which has just about been reached in our own commonwealth, and the

voice of Plato is prophetic, for, says he, being on the verge of bursting, everything does just that, and a wreck and ruin results in which the universal cry is for "one mighty and strong," even though he "rule with a rode of iron," be it a Calvin, Henry VII or Mussolini.[2] So democracy gives birth to oligarchy, anarchy, and eventually to tyranny.

But people are not used to kings, and as soon as things settle down that same "champion whom they have set over them and nursed into greatness" is let down as promptly and as utterly as was the deified La Fayette after the festival of the Federation. But every hero is not the kind that "sleeps while his king is stolen" and much the like; some, in fact nearly all, are prone to take things to heart much more than did the unruffled M. de La Fayette. The god will not be so lightly dismissed, if he succeeds in a come-back, it is as a "tyrant full grown" – a true Cosimo Medici. Of course, the new tyrant needs a body guard – examples for this are innumerable. Plato, already in his day, speaks of it as a famous and old familiar request. Any type of man can rule if supported by a devoted soldiery, from the simple and sincere Cromwell to the crazy Maximin. With a body guard, like Lear's daughters, the ambitious and selfish son of the democracy, once the power is in his hands, becomes the worst of masters – a tyrant.

If the oligarchy is productive of extreme type by natural selection, the tyranny is doubly so. The tyrant is a drunken man, so abnormal is his world. This is not a figure of speech. It is enlightening to scan the list of Roman emperors, noting how that office meant madness-drunkenness, if you will – to all but the man of a strong and philosophic (thence abnormal) nature. In no other so short a list of names in chronological succession are to be found so many men of fantastical excesses or such a surprising number of great souls. As for the many, those who do not govern, they congregate for a little honey: "panum et circenses,"[3] takes care of them.

The tyrant and his state are both about as bad off as possible. It is just a matter of one against the other, and the outcome is the evolving of just two states of mind – the slave and the master. The opposite of such a condition is achieved in a kingship. Early Egypt went through 4000 years of national vicissitudes, her story beginning and ending with absolute monarchy. But what a difference between the beginning and the end! Once the ruler of all was the slave of all – he has become master of all. The original motive was love – now it is fear. It was Buckley who first attempted to show that whatever happens to a nation is incidental to its real history. Our worries should not consider what will become of us, but what we will become. Culture, as Diogenes would prove, is a state of mind. The Parthenon is not culture, the Bastille not depression, the true nature of the state is like the kingdom of heaven – within.

The king has reason to be the happiest of all men. It is in his power to do more than anyone else. He cannot think or experience more, but he can come nearer to realizing his own thoughts. The early Christians thought to unite a perfect brotherhood and equality with a perfect monarchy, absolute freedom with absolute authority (K. Heussi) by assuming their monarch to be perfect. There is no denying that a government centralized under the complete power of a

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[2] Hitler had not yet come to power in Germany (1933), otherwise I'm sure Nibley would have mentioned him as well.

[3] Bread and circuses.

perfect monarch would be ideal. But so would a democracy of perfect members. Plato chooses the monarchy because it can be most nearly approximated, one perfect man being easier to find than thousands, and one philosopher being sufficient to the function of an obedient state. In a kingship "the meaner desires of the many are tempered and suppressed by a desires of the worthy few."

There are two criteria of class distinction in the state, economical and intrinsic. As regards the economical, "every state is two states." This tendency of every body of people to split into primarily two factions seems to be a universal principle by which capital and labor are but one of many forms of crystallization. East-side west-side, York and Lancaster, Guelfs and Ghibelins, Republicans and Democrats, Highlander and Lowlander, Catholic and Protestant, liberalist and fundamentalist, etc.; to sum it up, every issue has essentially TWO sides. But all in all, issues are more an excuse, an occasion, for fighting than a motive. The Capulets and Montagues are typical representatives of the feudal system, in which, at all times, arbitration has been nicely avoided. Classical writers lay the one cause of the Peloponnesian wars (Thucydides) to nothing but a general readiness of all contestants to fight. Through millenniums of natural selection, man's makeup has become peculiarly adapted to an environment of strife and confusion; he would be biologically out of place in a world of utter peace. As it would be too much to expect the sabre-toothed tiger to become an herbivore in a generation, so it may be unwise to try and force perfect peace on "man who is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward." In the civilized world man will continue to fight; it is the business of education to transfer this belligerent nature to fields of action in which it is needed.

There appears to be an unjust partiality to certain classes in the Republic. Thus the fine easy time of it enjoyed by the wives of the guardians in having children. Does being born a golden or a silver nature warrant such privileges merely by the fact of birth? The answer is, yes. Yet there is nothing to hinder anyone from competing for first honors. A person is esteemed because of his worth, he is worthy largely because he was born so, and over his birth we have no control. Such class distinction is done not by men but by nature, whose acts it is wise for men to recognize and conform to; if one wants to get sentimental about the injustice of the system, one need only regard that class distinction existing between the old and the young – whatever we think of it, it <u>is</u>.

The "watch-dogs" of the Republic are, before anything else, warriors. Should the best of us spend our lives as soldiers? This would counteract the above objections, to be privileged is to be free, but freedom from necessity does not exist, thence no one has preference but ability is proportionate to obligation. In an ideal world the sum of a man's character and actions, his life, like the valence of a chemical compound, is always zero, so that no man amounts to more than another. On this principle, Peter the Great tried to reform Russia, and there is good reason for believing if there had been more who understood, his plans might have been successful. As it was, with all the country against him, he accomplished more than a dozen good ruler's acting on conventional lines, with the full sympathies of the people. At a time when the oarsmen of a galley, called a galley slave at a later date, received the best of wages and was always a free man (Shephard: Sea Power in Ancient History) the position of a solider was not a bad one, he might be an Alcibiades, Marcus Aurelius or Plato himself.

Plato does a not altogether pleasing thing in suggesting the degradation of cowards in battle to the rank of husbandman or artisan. Better the old order, by which the mighty Argonauts were all husbandmen themselves, by which the artisan was the proud soldier. The need for specialism precluding such a system is bound to endanger the stability and supremacy of the state. Lest the career of the Praetorian guards be repeated in the state, the soldiers, as will be seen, must be subjected to the most severe education.

Plato knew that the wealth of nations is not to be measured in precious metals. Gold in the Republic has the same unenviable reputation that it has in Utopia. Strangely enough, in the Republic gold is a true symbol of class – but it is the mark of the lower rather than the higher class. In spite of Plato's proved advice, nations, notably France, still put great faith in mercantilism. Nothing has been the subject of more thorough experimentation. Futile as was the immense bullion in "Julius-Turm," it was no more so than the two-hundred tons of gold on which the Macedonian Empire rested, or the heaps of ingots which sustained the glory of Spain ~~so weakly~~. Plato provides for metal tokens of exchange in his state. The ideal city was to be a party in the maintenance of the very active trade of the world of his time. (It is but recently that H.R. Hall has shown how amazingly vigorous and widespread this activity as) not comfortably isolated and self-sufficient like Moore's. Money was indispensable for this; in the worlds of Petrie: "Corn (as a medium of exchange) for a city state, copper for a small group of cities, silver for an isolated country, gold for an empire, paper for the world."

This necessary coinage is handled by a class of middlemen, composed of the physically weak members of society, who shall take care of transactions for the men who affairs prohibit their coming together often. Such people are distinctly a class – other kinds of creatures, you might say, from the Guardians, who are not allowed to so much as touch gold or silver. One might think it unwise to entrust finances to this very dangerous class. Their physical handicap would warrant their being the slyest and craftiest (as they must be to avoid becoming eliminated) as well the most jealously ambitious of the populace. That Plato should pay so little attention to them seems at first a mistake of negligence, until one considers how slight the influence of such men on the source of history actually is. It is not the weakling Disraelis or Richilieus, who were idealists, of whom we are now speaking. Throughout the near east and southern Europe, where the writer has sojourned extensively, is to be found a class of men who live by viciously sharp wits, who can get the better of anyone in a deal, and whose bitter and cynical spirt is rather frightening to the uninitiated.. I do not know of a case where a single one of this class (they are nearly all hawkers, money-changers, etc., but really efficient financiers – capable of the offices of Plato's middle-men) has ever risen to the power of ruler. These men are not dangerous, though they have qualities of persistence and diplomacy which are sometimes amazing, because they have no magnificence of soul. Not ashamed of the calling of "nuisance", mean, small, petty, vindictive, with al the acute devilishness of Richard III, they yet lack the grand ideas and appetites – the pride by which "such men are dangerous."

Wealth is regarded as an advantage by the wise old Cephalus only because it banishes the necessity (unfortunately not the tendency) for being dishonest. Philanthropy, that noble institution of our state, is not so much as mentioned in the Republic, for no one there shall possess enough that he can give some away and still live himself. Some personal goods are unfortunately necessary. The savage wears all his wealth on his person and this because things

which fit the body are primary form of personal property. My helmet will not fit many other people; it is best that rather than being common property, it belong to me alone; the good knight's armor is part of his personality, his sword he identifies with his being – it stands in sacred relationship to him, he kisses it and swears by it as the Semite swears by his beard. Thus necessity insists under most conditions on the recognizing of personal property by shaping every man a bit different from the rest. Perhaps it is wise that people wear no clothes in the ideal state.

Rich people are a luxury to the state. Nothing need be said about the unwholesomeness of luxury, carrying man's interests as it does beyond necessity and diverting their energies from fields of endeavor in which it is so urgent that they be employed. The elaboration of the prototype can be but evil. This confirms Plato's right to derive imperfect forms of government and human character from superior ones. It is the original nature of man to be healthy. In the days of Aesculapius healing was a very simple affair, as it will no doubt some day be again after medicine emerges from the intricacies of its education to cross the same point in the cycle (not circle, for it is a little higher each time, every turn representing the attainment to an advanced principle) at which it was in Aesculapius' day, only to plunge into the darkness again to emerge at the same place on the circle, but another turn – another motive – higher, than the present one. A few healthy organisms thrown together in a garbage can produce, of themselves, as it were, contamination. So with sickness, the simple peasant and laborer has not time to get sick. In the Republic people should not get sick. Whatever ailments are the result of accident are soon banished by the general health of the afflicted, and perhaps by a physician. If by any means a physician were required it should be one who has often been sick and had the opportunity of practicing healing on himself. "Physician, cure thyself," is his certificate.

Today many states are establishing an order of things the reverse of Plato's. Disease is not being simplified for the rich, but complicated for the poor. This is a system of taxation which grants every citizen the right to elaborate medical treatment. The modern status of the healing art was not foreseen by Plato. Yet he teaches a lesson the value of which is just beginning to be appreciated by consigning the care of the public health to the educated public mind. Also, it is surprising how closely the "natural" cures of the Greek sanitarium parallel those of today. (Farnell)

There are three classes in the state represented by the types of 1. counselors, 2. traders, 3. auxiliaries. These are more than economical divisions, for the classes stand for the motives of reason, spirit and appetite respectively. The middle class in the state, or motive in the man, is free to join either of the other two, the higher or the lower. We have seen that TWO divisions is the rule. With whom shall the middle class or spirit side in? When educated, says Plato, spirit sides with reason, and they together can lead appetite to join them, making the state or individual at one with itself.

As to the classification of human being by their intrinsic worth – that is by evidence of physical, mental that is, all-round worth, it is made necessary principally by the need for specializing guardians of the state.

To belong to the class of guardians, one must present certain high credentials, which are the evidence, found by experiment, of all the qualities of a good watch-dog. Swiftness, strength

and endurance must be combined with intelligence, patience, gentleness, in short, all the virtues of a philosopher. Family is not a consideration in determining class. The nature of the son is not dependent on the metal of his parents. Plato thus recognizes the great principle of mutation. The brightest children are carefully noted – "we shall watch them at every age." They will be sifted out by a series of elimination tests, calculated to deceive and confuse (thus he recognizes the principle of artificial selection). Those that pass the tests, who "keep their first estate," will be consigned to a certain kind of higher education (to be described later) devoting their lives to public service, as everyone else, but respected above all.

As for those which show themselves less valiant, they will be content with their lot. Gold and silver, brass and iron characters are such by nature. Some by nature simply are not born to be philosophers, insists Plato. Among these lower lights, however, are yet pronounced stages of glory. The pride of the captains of tens, hundreds and fifties is in complete disregard of rank, about equal in each case. Even your general goes not surpass in pride the gorgeously caparionned private in the ranks because that were quite impossible – no one could be prouder of more self-satisfied than that lowly one tricked out in all the traps and furbishments of war. On such a plan, everyone will be happy in Plato's state. But whatever happens, a man of brass or iron must not guard the state.

This classification is physical as well as mental. It has been seen that men are relegated to the class of money-handlers because, for one thing, they are weak in body. As for those diseased in body, they will be left to die. This is an unsentimental course of action. Corrupt and incurable persons will have suicide recommended to them. If there by any great souls among such, such an invitation will arouse them to desperate efforts – there would be no danger of losing the right kind by suicide. I think almost anyone, if suicide were suggested to him every day by his fellows would either expunge himself (in which case, well and good – he is a weak soul) or amount to something. This seemingly outrageous thought of Plato's is one of the best, and could be well put into immediate practice in our own society.

Justice demanding specialism, demands classes of society. Acting justly, every man attends strictly to his own business. Being thus preoccupied and seeing plainly that he has quite as much as he can do, he has no time nor reason to deplore his relatively humble station. In this state the eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of thee," and there will be no contempt of one class for the other. There is no class distinction between men and women as such, any more that the relative worth of a man can be identical with the amount of hair on his head; sex is a purely material distinction.

Plato considers war without regard to whether it is good or bad – it is. (I have an awful mess of notes): The thought of small children witnessing their parents, male and female, engaged in battle in order that they might also learn the art of war is not an edifying one. But is it not more edifying than children who see their parents pitted against a common enemy than against each other? Why not be honest about it? The children of every state are being raised up in the knowledge, or worse still, the ignorance, that they are some day going to have to fight battles. Why spoil the chance for victory by withholding an experience with some day they are bound to race? Of course, this answer to natural repugnance is not altogether satisfactory. If one state does thing, what is to keep the enemy from doing the same? And what is to keep the children

from breaking away from their guardians (they have the very swiftest horses) and joining the fray? Or from seeing at a distance the children of the enemy, cheering for their side, and learning to regard them as enemies from childhood, or even closing with them on the spot in a stupid and disastrous children's war? What mischief might be done in the spirit of childish belligerence which finds expression in rough games and neighborhood gang affairs were to be diverted into channels of life and death policy!

Pride is at the bottom of all great mistakes. The Greek cities came near to conquering their pride than any other societies ever. Witness the case of the Miletians, who, baffled at city problems, sent for the Parians to come from their little back-woods situation to tell them (the Miletians) how to run their city. The advice given was so excellent (it was strictly Platonic) that Miletus by following it because the greatest city in the world. Yet such a victory of reason over pride is effaced in the long and senseless Peloponnesian wars, and final passing of Greek supremacy, due to silly jealousies. Plato took war for granted an unavoidable, and treated it from that stand-point.

Plato's foreign policy is regard to war is thus far a little inconsistent: An important weapon against the enemy is his own discord. While the guardians are at one in the ideal state, which they are bound to be, the whole state is united, for they control it. All other states are two states, at war with each other. Moreover, nations would willingly ally themselves with the lean city of the watch-dogs, as Darius was advised to with the Scythians, on the grounds that the conquered city could yield no treasure.

Another interesting phase of the foreign problem is the attitude to Pan-Hellenism. No Hellene was to be held as a slave by another Hellene – and the spoiling of the dead was not to be tolerated. These ideas were already familiar ones: note how the victorious patriots at Piraeus, vanquers of the 30 tyrants, under Thrasybulus desisted from despoiling the vanquished dead because they were fellow citizens. When Plato adds to these conditions the provision that Hellenic territory should not be burned or plundered, one wonders: why have a war at all? Why not a united Greece? The answer is found in the nature of the Greek himself, and has been treated by every author of Greek history. Plato knew his people. Greek would fight Greek, but in a different spirit than he found barbarians – it was not a war, but a domestic discord. Civil war, as we understand it, could only take place within one state – one city in Greece, while foreign war could only be between Greek and barbarian. This inter-urban warfare is a peculiar thing, in a class by itself, much as a war between a couple of these United States would be. One of the beauties of modern warfare is that it must be waged either in awful earnest or not at all. This is a condition peculiar to our times, and would of course have lent a different color to Plato's plans. But from right up until the most recent times, comic opera wars have been familiar things. Today things are blown up with an explosive not capable of burning gradually nor in installments. Nor does one "bear the dint of many a grievous fight," and live to go "pricking on the plaine" for more.

The management of domestic affairs is a more delicate affair. In the case of a foreign war one places one's thumb, or better still one's heel, on the source of mischief. Not so when the mischief, "the mystery of iniquity is among you." For the best management of affairs at home as seen, provides an aristocratic form of government, the leaders being chosen against or with their

will. In this state the elder rules the younger, for old heads are more apt to be found on old than on young shoulders (albeit the latter phenomena is not unknown), in spite of such we continue to build feeling troughs for one-headed cows).

The making of laws will be left to the guardians. The "people" are not to make their own laws in the Republic any more than they do in ours. To this administration of Best Minds will be given the privilege of lying, and that his be not resented "we will make the falsehood as much like the truth as we can." Such a practice one might think would be disastrous in all but a perfect state. On the contrary, it is the principle on which rulers have acted since time immemorial. The Pope said of Richelieu that if there were no hell, then that wily cardinal was indeed a great statesman. But if the rulers are allowed the privilege of lying, to them alone is the license given, for "gods and men hate the true lie." True statesmanship consists half in picking your men; the ability to spot and classify qualities in men must be an indispensable gift of the ruler – to this knack almost along the great kings of Europe, without exception, owe their successes and the foolish ones their losses. Those who govern ought not to love the task, lest they be rivals. To understand others, the ruler must have the imagination to put himself in their places, this capacity of experiencing anything belongs only to the philosopher (Kant's lecture on Geography, nat. history, etc.), the phenomena of which he had never seen with his eyes.

As it is the end of the soul to superintend, command and deliberate the actions of the individual, so it is the like functions in the state are taken over by those whose philosophic natures correspond with the appetitive and acquisitive characters of the man, as the higher faculties of the mind to the body. This ruling minority is capable of maintaining temperance in the state, guiding the actions of the multitude as the individual man controls the beasts within him.

The measures of the wickedness of an act is not made with an eye to moral interpretation. To Plato there would seem to be really no such thing as innocence. An act is either sinful or praiseworthy; the innocent take credit for what I am not – murderer, thief, liar, etc. – I must also take punishment for what I am not – philosopher, perfect student, champion of human happiness, etc. The two balance each other and give zero. In line with the claim that the injury of another can be in no case just, is Socrates punishment for the ignorant – he must learn from the wise. As Plato's state leave its enemies alone that "the wicked shall destroy the wicked," so our executive system allows for the annihilation of criminal circles by each other's, this system of "the wicked shall destroy the wicked" proving itself so efficient is another point for Plato. Socrates thinks that men do evil unwillingly, that they are willingly deprived of the evil and unwillingly of the good, the evil and good being the form of resolutions going out of a man's mind. So no one should be maliciously punished. Nevertheless punishment silences and humanizes. The nature of such punishment to fit each case could be determined only by a judge of great experience. Who is good at money is good at keeping it, and it takes a thief to catch a thief, but the judge, unlike the doctor, is not to have first hand, but only philosophical experiences of the afflictions of his patients (they are patients, not victims).

Mankind censure injustice, fearing to suffer it rather than to commit it. Is it on such a basis that laws are made? Is that not the doctrine of "do unto others as you would have others do unto you?" In other words, isn't Glaucon right? All law is lower law – a command to do a thing

without knowing why. Faith is not the ultimate but only a means to knowledge. Laws are based on experience, is Plato's assertion, and are the outcome of necessity. Socrates seems rather an inconsistent law-maker himself, for after protesting, "of harmonies I know nothing," he proceeds to tell just how music should be presented to the people. Music will discourage going to law as gymnastics to the doctor.

The most important subject discussed in the Republic is education. We have spoken of the character of the Guardian of the State: such a mind as his or hers "clear as the sun, fair as the moon, and terrible as any army with banners" is, to expand the quotation, "rare as the dodo." It is the product of training as well as of birth, that he is able eventually to superintend, command and deliberate. In spite of his excellent character, or rather because of it, special attention is given to the development of character in the Guardian. In the first place, he must be spirited and gentle. His spirit can be heightened if impressed with the earnestness and importance of every occasion, by athletic contests, and controlled by music and philosophy. His training must improve courage. This is possible by education because, as we have seen, courage is a form of knowledge. He can be taught not to fear death by general disrepute of the custom of mourning for the dead, and by being given a clear view of the ideal. They must become acquainted with all phases of the mind in order to be able to deal with them, but never this by actual experience, "madness, like vice, is to be known but neither practiced nor imitated." That rare trait, or gift spoken of, of seeing the true qualities of people, can also be improved with education. It is, in fact, largely a product of experience, by which one learns to "know men." Another trait of character that must be inborn and yet can be taught is temperance. The guardian should always be the last to get drunk.

The Spartans actually used to get Helots drunk and then show them to their sons as a lesson in temperance. Also "lest the watchdogs turn on the flock" as the Praetorian guards or Spanish regiments, "the remedy or prevention is education," by which alone they might learn the outcome of such behavior. Thus by selection the best characters are obtained, and by education these characters are improved, and by another kind of education added upon. I have expressed fond hopes that the intelligence of man might be increased . Now intelligence, like any substance, is the properties by which it is known – an orange is round, firm, golden, juicy, etc. A thing is the sum of all the adjectives we know which describe it. As we can never know all the adjectives we can never know the thing perfectly.

If the properties of intelligence can be formed at the will of man, as what properties cannot, how can we claim that a man's intelligence remains the same? This training of the guardians' character, if it will improve him, might be used to make guardians out of anyone; why discriminate in choosing? We choose the Best Minds for guardians not because they are something different from others, but because they have a head-start over the others and will be the easiest to deal with.

Hand in hand with the general training and "character building" goes technical training, which fits the Guardian for one office in particular. Plato approves of the traditional system by which music and gymnastics make up the entire field of teaching. Music and gymnastics will be preserved with no innovations. But poetry and literature, included in the teaching of music, must be purged of passages which might represent noble intentions. Thus in a piece all unworthy

wishes or suggestions will preclude emulation by being "oratio obliqua" in the mouths of persons of unenviable character. It may seem a bit far-fetched to avoid identifying contemptible or vicious acts with admired persons, but let us remember the great role hero-worship plays in forming our lives. As the state sets some champion over it and nurses him into greatness, so the soul will set itself ideals. Every one is a hero worshiper and feels himself justified whatever his [ ] in doing hero has done. The voice, mannerisms, or even the limp of the King will find imitators at the court. So, if the guardian is not to indulge in loud laughter, his heros should certainly not laugh like Holofernes.

Shall our guardians be imitators? is asked. For one thing, they learn war, as everything else, by the apprentice system. How could one "be a non-conformist and be a man," in the Republic? Plato pays little attention and devotes little discussion to those fields which fit in his state and yet which allow for original creation. Nor should it be otherwise. It is a small soul that will be judged by his own standards alone; in nearly every case the work of such compared with things of known worth shows very poorly indeed. It is the true genius, and best of all the useful one, who like Bach, can produce a great masterpiece working under special, limiting directions and set specifications. In a world where necessity does not exist, the "free soul" with the open collar and tidal hair might be justified, the Republic does not take account of such a world. I think it is noble that the guardians should be forbidden to imitate unworthy sounds and action "avoiding the very appearance of evil." I have never been reconciled to men and women acting the parts of characters inferior to themselves (everybody says that is silly prudishness, but I always take offence at seeing it.)

The end of music in education is love or beauty. Plato is very wise in seeing all that life holds for us, be it this life or the next, is beauty.

Everything that deceives enchants; when you see something which is not, you are not in a perfectly normal state of mind. The guardian must be the first person in the state to see illusions as such, the last to see them as anything else. Education is here striving to attain as near a perfectly healthy condition as possible: faulty education alone made the "Dark Ages" a time of illusions, when all Europe would be moved and its life directly influenced by the birth of a child with a golden tooth, or a Saint become the guide and claim the fealty of men because she had succeeded in roasting a batch of snow-balls, or fetching sunlight into a monastery with a bucket. Philosophy is for the old and experienced, the natural desire to beat somebody at anything will not allow the young to pursue dialectic with only the motive – the search for truth.

The education of the guardian lasts his whole life. First, he receives special attention at an early age, infancy even, by distinguishing himself by his eagerness and attention any or all the properties of which intelligence consists. His whole life he is participating in an elimination contest in which the slings and arrows he must bear are not only those of outrageous fortune, but some are artificially supplied that he may show his mettle more quickly. For every period of life through which he has passed victorious, pure reward awaits him – crowns of glory – and responsibility. The incapable will not be jealous of such a reward.

But however severe the tests, life in the republic is all in fun. We are now in the midst of living as much as we will ever be, and if we postpone our joy till the ultimate goal is reached, we

shall never know happiness. Education is to be regarded as an amusement by the children, there will be no driving; like the airplane, the mind is sustained and propelled forward not by pressure from the rear, but by a vacuum from the front and above, the "pressure" being the constant and unnoticed weight of the atmosphere. So the mind rushes on, into and through problems not by the driving force of the will, but by the attraction of that vacuum, curiosity or wonder, which it is always eagerly, unconsciously, impulsively moving forward to fill. "Knowledge which is acquired under compulsion contains no hold on the mind."

Labors, lessons, danger, are on the program of the small child. He who is most at ease with this schedule, his propensities being observed in his athletic life is selected during the two or three years before he is twenty he spends his time at gymnastics – that is, physical play, one long vacation of hunting, swimming, wrestling, running, etc. These constitute the "labors, lessons and dangers!" At twenty there is a classification, those "found worthy to stand at that day" will receive special honor, passing on to a group which studies the scientific meaning of and relationship between the facts, which have been indiscriminately acquired in the preceding years. Two facts justify such a procedure in our own world. In the first place one must re-learn all the knowledge of a scientific nature he might have acquired during childhood. A great number of quotations I learned years ago I still remember, but whenever I wish to use one, I must go back to the work from which it came. Then, too, the scientific classification of facts as a science in itself is unfamiliar to all but a few today. We classify the facts as we acquire them. Result: Washington dismounts the cherry tree on page 122 just under the picture of Mount Vernon – so I learned to classify history as a child – not that I was taught that way, worse still, I was left to invent my own system. At thirty, the best of the elect are elevated to the highest honor and exposed for five years to the amazing light of philosophy with gymnastics laid aside, after which time descends into the "underworld" to "preach to the spirits in prison," losing himself in the world of real life – "made one of us, our elder brother, a little lower than the angels" to find it, at the end of fifteen years in contemplating the true light of truth.

The classification is the essence of education. Its absence renders our modern system vain and futile. Observe the keys of the typewriter. Conscientious effort can have them all learned in ten minutes. That is what we call education – learning. By that time they are actually the property of the mind, but what a feeble tool they make! In the course of months each key, as a consumately simple fact is reviewed a thousand times. Yet after YEARS of application to these the mind and body slip and falter. How much more so with an equal number of complexly interrelated and far-reaching facts! Each phase of each one is of deep significance, capable and deserving of an endless number of interpretations. It has been estimate that to ring all the combinations possible on the 15 bells of Westminster would require, no note being struck twice in a combination, some 5 billions of years. Have I any one fact, however contemptibly simple it may appear, at my command? Can I call it into service whenever conditions would make it of use with the same accuracy and spontaneous promptness with which the typewriter key is struck? The student is allowed to strike whatever keys he feels inclined to, no matter what he wishes to "write" (interpret). The business of education is to teach him that such and such keys exist, the purpose often so vague that we actually speak of "abstract" learning!!

The group of such men as are the guardians must be the smallest minority (by the time the fifty year mark is reached, Plato doesn't expect to have more than a handful – a couple, most

likely) and the state is run for the greatest good of ALL, giving the Guardian no more right to be happy than anyone else. All have equal rights in the Republic, everyone is dealt with as if his desire was the good of the state – everyone is given an equal chance to help. How are others to spend life to the greatest advantage? That is the ultimate question in the Republic.

A general education dealing alike with all would have to be given when all are on the same plane of development, that would be before much of any separating had taken place. There is justice for all in basing estimates of capacity not on examinations which favor particular types, nor on special contests of prowess for the purpose, but on a test which all can understand and all perform with willingness. Even the feeble-minded may participate with the best in play, where he has his best chance to make a showing. In play, where the mind is given free reign its character becomes evident – Alcibiades as a very small boy lays himself down in the course of an oncoming chariot to make the driver stop; Pericles was a child wonderfully reticent.

Appetite, spirit and reason rule men's actions (as will be seen) represented in the state by traders, auxiliaries and counselors. Now, by education, spirit, or the love of living the de [?] can be led to joining with reason in a majority against appetite. The public as a whole will learn by imitation. The education of our heroes being the main theme of the education discussion, Plato does not come to tell us how the rest shall be edified after having been eliminated from the running for Guardianship. The elimination system not only picks out the Watch-dogs, but it also classifies all people beneath that dignity, each being given the work for which he is fitted. The education of the heroes is that of everyman up till the time when he is eliminated, but there is no reason for his retrograding from that point simply because the Best Mind is progressing at a pace too stiff for him.

One point is emphasized in the general system of education. That is the business of representing things as they are. Although Socrates finds "something divine in being able to remain unconvinced at one's arguments," such divinity is only for those with an understanding heart, and an experienced estimate of values. Plato is not for starting the child out in life on pure fable and then adding truth gradually as one progresses. It must be understood that Plato's only horror of a lie is that it will work mischief in the state: there are useful as well as hateful lies. But the works of the immortals must be purified of their great fault, lies – not lies, for Achilles may have wept, and Mr. Farnell has recently shown that certainly Achilles may have lived, but inconsistencies. It seems a bit narrow in Socrates to call what he takes for inconsistences out and out lies. But for all that, "history is a lie,: we will give Socrates the argument on the ample grounds that, especially in education, a truth or falsehood is not a thing as said but as understood. "Honest Iago" deserved this title as literally as anyone could. The first step, then, in providing for the general education, will be to censor writers of fiction. The thought of god planting guilt to destroy a house, as he did Pharaoh's, is to Socrates suicidal, ruinous, impious. Neither does god take many shapes. The Book of Job gets around both of these objections: god does not plague Job, but, challenged by the adversary, is constrained to give that Old Serpent the permission to do so, and god is not a whirlwind, but speaks out from in it. Such doctrines as the existence of children-frighteners are utterly barbarous, but very fundamental. Lilith, the mythical third person on earth, was by profession a child-scarer among the ancient Babyloniams (Budge.) Hymns to the gods and praises of famous men should be the only poetry allowed – an outlandish condition but not an unheard of one, for centuries such a code equally severe has

existed in certain Calvinistic communities. To the adequately trained mind we hand over the care of the body.

Socrates takes his religion seriously. His attention to religious rites in the beginning of the Republic is more than a gesture of toleration. He always puts implicit faith in the Delphian Apollo. Just how far is he really "sold" on the doctrine? In this first place, it is interesting to note that the festival which Socrates was attending was a NEW THING in Athens. Greek religion was strong enough not to have the horror of all innovation that characterizes all blind faith. From Noah to Paul, and ever since then, persecution of prophets and reformers has been justified on the grounds the enlightened ones were attempting innovations: "That Moses is our Prophet and Abraham our father we know, but who is this fellow?" is typical of the same self-righteous, harmony with antiquity that pronounces that "the scripture are a sealed book; the awful voice of prophecy is forever stilled." The Greeks of Plato's time, like the Greeks of today, must have been very religious ... to me the forms and trumperies of the modern Greek church are so queerly like a caricature that one must take them all very seriously or not at all. It is not all an artistic-romantic justification such as appeals to some persons and is expounded in the Marble Faun. Such a dead-earnest rite as that of the Lokrian maidens (Farnell) would be performed only with sincere conviction. Herodotus speaks so definitely and repeatedly of the Pythian, showing along with his practical and skeptical spirit of criticism such implicit faith in the superhuman powers of that oracle, that one is almost forced to admit that "there must have been something to it" – certainly for Herodotus, as well as a great number of shrewd, honest and intelligent men, such as old Cephalus. For all its symbolism, enigmatical sayings, taurobolien, mystic feats, ecstasy – for all its hero-cult, chthonian and other fertility rites and neolithic traditions, greek religion could be regarded in various phases and by whomsoever was of such a turn, with Calvinistic cold-bloodedness, even with the simple certainty with which Socrates accepts "the prophetic voice of his guardian deity."

Care should be taken in maintaining a religion for the state. In spite of his judging everything by its usefulness, Plato unlike Bismarck, does not undertake to meddle in religious matters, but leaves to him who sits on the navel of the earth his right to interpret religion to all mankind. This shows his religious sincerity. But Socrates is sure that those things in which religion go against other correct principles are not from god. Thus he would censure the mendicant prophets and Orphic deceivings, because they are against his general principles. He will now allow passion to be imitated by anyone – and this lets the religion down a notch. Religious themes were the specialty of painters in the renaissance because as Plato says, a passionate nature is best imitated, hence an oversupply of "Ecce Homo" and Maria Dorlorosa themes – they of all can be best imitated. Religion is of great service in the Republic, for whereas business disputes , etc., are left to be settled by the parties themselves, without divine help men go in a circle, not just religious faith, but divine help, Plato believes.

Most the questions of ethics may be explained in terms of the good, the useful – that productive of the greatest general happiness. His inducing the incurable to suicide has been mentioned. We are solicitous with old age because we will someday be old ourselves. Socrates always showed great respect for age. This deference toward the aged is supposed to be one of the first steps toward civilization. In the primitive world, the fact that the old bull once ruled the herd does not warrant him a green and revered old age; that fact is more likely to be his undoing

the moment he shows signs of weakness. Some writers today think the aged should be classed with hopeless cripples, for there is precious small hope of their ever becoming younger, and encouraged to practice suicide. Nietzsche has reason for his disgust with the deference of the strong toward the weak, ancient and sickly. Viewed in a non-sentimental, even common-sense light, a man is "through" as soon as his chance for being of service to society are nil. As the world grows increasingly efficient the question of the disposal of the aged will ... [line lost at the bottom of the page].

"The State," he says, "should increase only so far as it is consistent with unity. How far is that? It is a well known fact that strife is bitter in proportion to the nearness of the contestants, the most inhuman hatred of all being attained within the family group. In a club, family, partnership or within the individual soul, positive and negative elements will always be present. In fact, as has been seen, only the perfect soul is at perfect unity with itself. It is for exactly this reason – the perfect likeness in matters of unity among groups of all sizes that Plato says size is not to be [measured] by numbers – "the city shall be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing"

The inevitable subdivision and mutual estrangement of rich and poor is an origin of class in the state that one can always count on. The origins of class distinction are three: 1. Political, as in Sparta and in India and the Assyrian empire (Rogers). Here [the United States] is a <u>racial</u> one, the political relationship of conqueror to conquered, clearly illustrated in the long course of Hebrew history in the vicissitudes and fortunes of the Hebrew race. 2. Financial, as in the modern world to a large extent, and 3. Intellectual or philosophical, the form of class being that present very plainly in the Republic of Plato.

We have seen in the working of an oligarchy how "money answereth all things." Is not all payment in money a form of bribery? That would be an extreme viewpoint, but nevertheless the difference between pay and bribery is a subtle one, especially when one considers that it is impossible to represent the exact worth of a man's services in cold cash. Legal and illegal in this case does not mean right and wrong, or just and unjust. Nature does not pay for work done. However, the farmer may exert himself, his reward is dependent on the regulator of times and seasons who seem to hold man altogether in disregard and who alone determines what the value of money shall be. Thrasymachus is willing to reveal his great secret if he is paid for it. I was at first offended by such open venality, but I soon saw that it was Thrasymachus' honesty rather than policy that prompted such a frank demand. Why not come out with it and admit from the outset that one wants money and honor for one's pains, rather than showing indirectly how very grievously one pines for those things by long confinement and desperate effort in a university, by which one employs every means to achieve not knowledge so much as credentials which will plead one's cause for one in a way in which people understand and have learned to wink at – even to respect?

There are three modes of paying a ruler for his services. The first is payment in money. Is this to be understood as a fee? Political offices pay notoriously scrimpy salaries – what in our land as all others is the object of hot and expensive campaigning for obscure offices of short duration. The answer is summed up in one word: "backshish." For fear of wandering from the point I must here eliminate a stirring description of the "backshish system" (head waiter system).

The second motive is in honor, regarded as the one good and praiseworthy motive in our civilization. But this is the vainglorious one of the three, and as Plato shows that it cannot be conducive to the greatest happiness, another inducement must be found for the ideal state.

This motive can only be the intellectual one. Who seeks neither wealth nor fame has nothing to expect from the state. He must be forced into office. This is setting a penalty for refusing to serve. Indeed, with the true philosopher, that which forces is necessity. As soon as necessity no longer urges, the philosopher returns to his shop or his farm, as a number of great souls actually have. Through no other desire than to be just , to do what the occasion demands, does the philosopher find himself in power. Such are they who have "greatness" thrust upon them. What are the motives which produce certain behavior? What is Socrates' motive in talking about a republic is love of argument – he forces the argument on Polemarchus, after trying to bring Cephalus out, and so he goes through the discussion in great enthusiasm. Plato's object in writing the piece is the actual working out of the plan, as has been seen in his scrupulous care to make every point applicable here and now. Is it possible that such a state be created by us? On certain conditions only.

To start with, the old picture must be rubbed out. Plato will begin his experiment with a race of ten-year-olds. The old man must be cast off, sink into the grave, or be buried in the water to arise, cleansed and born again. That is indispensable, for as things are today, the world cannot support a philosopher. Although the world can never be a philosopher, if obedient, it can be saved by one. From Nabonidus to Woodrow Wilson, the idealist has been misunderstood, and still continues to be so until the public is educated. The public means well – no one is willingly deprived of the good – but truth will forever be on the scaffold, because the world is so full of a number of things that many will be satisfied to call anything philosophy. They cannot recognize philosophy when they see it, and there is not the slightest chance of their ever seeing it. "If ye are of the world, the world will love you." How can the philosopher, of all persons, expect to be esteemed of mankind? To reform the mob the philosopher must get the mob on his side by giving them a little honey. If he yields to his ideals, as he most always will, in this case – as well nigh must to win the affection ate [sp?] following of the public he becomes a dissembler or a tyrant. "Philosophy is left desolate with her marriage rite incomplete." A sorry picture, in spite of which, however, the ideal state does exist somewhere. For by the time the philosopher has dissembled enough to get into office his love of truth is quite cooled. Instead she is wooed by the butcher, the baker, and the candle-stick maker, who think much of her reputation and the name she will give them. In this philosophic love affair the public is at its best – this is the public of the ideal state, which like every other public and like the swine and the dog, will be filthy still, returning again and again to its first love. The outcome of all this is that the philosopher who endures to the end is a rare bird indeed – a small and peculiar people – the chosen – the elect, sifted and purified in the fuller's fire and of more worth than fine gold. Such a remnant, one of a city and two of a generation, is the hope upon which Plato built his Republic, and for such a man he searched in his lifetime. Is all this possible? he asks, and answers that it is none the worse for not being possible. There is a pattern laid up somewhere from the beginning of the world.

The motive for such a man's serving the state we have seen to be one or three modes of payment – punishment for refusing, he is driven by circumstance. There are rewards for the child, youth or man whenever he comes thru a stage of the trial victorious. The Guardian lives in perfect poverty as happy as the olympian victor. The idea of crowning and kissing heroes, as an inducement to great deeds as well as deification after death, is typically Greek, and my Nordic nature takes an uncompromising attitude to such. The deification of heroes incites the youth to emulation. The greatest motive force of the people is imitation – hero worship the most effective form in a state. Then too the multitude can be moved by the old desire for a little honey.

There are three great motives for any action representing types of man or types of state. They are 1. The love of learning. 2. Love of wisdom, 2. The love of honor and 3. The love of gain. They are also given by Plato as the three principles of the soul or classes of state as 1. Love of learning, 2. Love of sensual delight – always identified with love of glory, and 3. Love of money. These are forms of the great trilogy, 1. Reason, 2. Passion, and 3. Emotion or 1. Appetite, 2. Reason, and 3. Spirit. It is the business of education as seen to unite spirit – the tendency to live – with reason to eventually produce desirable appetites.

Plato, like Paul, believed it wise that a man regard his actions as an INVESTMENT. We have good reason for investing our energies in the possibility of a continued life after death. There is a chance that such a life does not exist, but even if the chance that it does is the very slightest, we are justified in investing our actions in "eternity preferred." It is true, if there is no resurrection from the dead, then "we are of all men most miserable." But still we are willing to stake everything on the great hope. It is our greatest motive for living as we do.

The question as to whose interest is foremost in the mind of the shepherd, his own, his master's, or the sheep, Plato settles by declaring the ruler of all the servant of all. But the shepherd is bound to think of himself. It is only when he sees that his own happiness is dependent on the happiness toward which he contributes in the state that he act on the noblest motives. In order that he see that, he must be education, as said.

Plato's eternal "common sense" never allows his idealism to get sentimental nor his scientific planning to become mechanical. Deportment, clothing and manners in general are the first reforms in a state which falls under an idealizing government (the influence of) as the gentry of a good part of modern Europe will testify. Not so Plato: his broad-mindedness is superb. With him there is to be no legislation, but all will be determined by the people themselves. So common business disputes will be settled out of court. Fixed lots in the drawing or bribes may seem unethical, as do the lies which the administration publishes to the people, but here it must again be reminded the ethical is the good, the good the useful, and the useful that which makes for happiness. Therefore, when necessary the Guardian must lie if he is to be just, that is, to pay strict attention to business – and as the necessary determines the wise, and the wise one's course of action, and the course of action the just, that wise act is the just act and the just act is the wise act. The lie does not cause the conscience to revolt if the conscience has been educated to the proper understanding of values. One of man's noblest acts is the control of feelings in the face of great misfortune. This is the wise act; in fact, it is forbidden to represent the other kind of behavior as indulged in by the gods, yet it is dictated solely by the voice of conscience – by inhibition, the working of which are the essence of civilization (which Mr. Jack London strove

all his life to illustrate), so by another method we have justice and wisdom running a parallel course.

Socrates felt he would be opening a Pandora's box in discussing his plans for matrimony in the state. The explanation of whatever sounds radical is the doctrine of perfect equality of man and woman, and a philosophic way at looking at love (by which madness and intemperance are not allowed to approach true love) which has got the name of "Platonic love," regarded by most people as some kind of a great joke. Women are provided with a zero costume and one and all are scandalized (that is significantly the reaction which the Scriptures attribute to the teachings of Christ – "they were scandalized," the most delicious form of self-approving objection to anything not understood.) For another thing, wives and children, like all property, are to be held in common, and no one is to know his own. There is no reason for being offended at this. The sanctity of marriage today is merely the sanctity of property, and the sanctity of property is the root of all evil.) Archeologists have found that the most venerable formula of the race is "trespassers will be prosecute (Petrie)." We do not know of the matrimony of the early Christian who "had all things in common," but we have reason for believing that it was very different from that practiced today (Heussi) – perhaps more like Plato's. To avoid licentiousness in the breeding of humans, marriage will be made very holy. From 20 to 40 for women and from 25 to 55 for men (a serious age) people are to beget children. The age of the parents has been found to have more to do with the mental condition of children and any other pre-natal influence. Consanguinity has no evil effects where both parents are normal. In fact, some authorities suggest a general mating of cousins as a way to improve the mental timbre of the race (A. H. Tredgold, *Mental Deficiency*).

All begetting must be sanctioned by the state. It will be controlled by the institution of public hymeneals to which only eligibles will be admitted, that child coming from another source being a deformity in the state. The matings at these hymeneals are arranged quite innocently by a system of "fixed lots" (Plato runs a risk of getting caught here). The good offspring of noble souls are given over to the care of nurses, the deformed are spirited away to a mysterious unknown place (assassinated, let us hope), and this, all sentiment barred, will make for the greatest joy of the whole. While having children the mothers of guardians have an easy time of it, but no mother is ever to known her own child. At this, visions arise, reminiscent of the trend of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" – of broken bonds of affection and terrible ordeals of love. Let us not forget that the family is NOT broken up, the city is literally, in every sense of the word, a family, in which everybody has a claim on the affections of everybody else. It has always been thought that lovers were destined for each other from the beginning, and that nothing more fatal could happen than the separation of one from the "only" one. Recently published statistics show that, on the average, a man marries a woman (and, the woman the man) who lives within three miles of his house. On such principles could the sentimental objections to Plato's plan of eugenics be rebutted.

Art is an important institution in the state. It is the product of an urgent necessity: "we wish that imitative art could prove her case." Yet because of its natural preference for the passionate and untrue element art is to be severely censured. Art must be beautiful and edifying. A real or a true art would be just the thing, but such cannot be had. The artist is not in a position to really imitate – witness your outlandish sword-fights on the stage, unnatural love affairs, crass

colors, and far-fetched sound interpretations. Art does not teach. I have learned to imagine NOTHING in music – it is absolute beauty. The lyre and the harp are the only instruments to stay in the city, while the country will be allowed the pipe. I do not think Socrates was in a position to speak about music for us. He not only protested his ignorance of harmonies, but the Greek music, if we are to accept what clues we can find for it, was most likely a damnable bedlam of unbearable discord. One thing to the point: rhythms must be noble, for when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the state change with them. That gives us an idea of the true significance of jazz in our civilization, which in strict accordance with Plato's doctrine, is called a "Jazz Age.")

Art must be a breath from Parnassus, edifying and wholesome. We persist in thinking of the world of art as something apart from the "world of affairs," and indeed it is. Perhaps in America art is suffering from one of the two causes which are fatal to it, an excess of wealth, or an excess of poverty, both of which have time and again proved the stumbling block of one headed for an ideal. So it would seem to be with Southey or Chatterton, the one turned silly by money, the other killed by poverty. The main trouble, says Plato, with the art world, is that there are two few seekers after the vision of truth, absolute beauty, and a great army of imitators.

Poetical imitations are ruinous: they are not a vehicle of knowledge. Homer did no good, you poems all have weak stories (what would he have said of Keats!). In the imitative art a man married to inferior principles has inferior offspring. Thus it is plain, Socrates is judging poetry by the old criterion of the ultimate public joy, which he supposes is hindered in its attainment by the perception and action of poorly and falsely presented material. Witness what poets have done to the mind of the many in regard to ideals, the nature of true greatness – how it has been misrepresented (the poet like the newspaperman has a highly specialized idea of success).

The various institutions and acts of man can be understood only when motives are known. The dramatic story of the trial of Jean d'Arc is not a story of acts, which are all wrong and not wished for, but of motives, and so will history. Uzziah, anxious to steady the arc from falling is struck dead on touching it, not because of his motives, or because of his act, but because of a principle.

The problem of real truth or the theory of ideas plays an important role in the Republic. In speaking of intelligence, it was said that a thing or substance was the properties of that substance. All we can know about a coconut is a series of describing adjectives: the coconut IS those adjectives appendaged, if you must, to the word "something." To one who has seen the inside of a coconut the nut is not what it is to one who has not. To the latter, the nut has no associations with white. He knows nothing white about it, to him the nut is one thing, to me another – to a student of coconuts still another. Which of these many nuts is the real one? Is there somewhere someone who has completely described a coconut – this would require the description of its origin, which would mean a description of all the creation of the world. To such a one the true nut (it may not even be a nut) is revealed. Is an eye that which sees? No, for an eye disconnected with the brain ceases to see, the mere refraction of light is not vision; vision is cognizance. The eye helps to see, it is an agent, by which one sees. But so does the sun help us to see, it is also an agent, as indispensable as the eye, to seeing. So it is a from of eye. What really sees is the soul. "The soul is the eye," says Plato. Its seeing is knowledge, and when it

sees the good it receives a revelation of truth and science, but not truth itself. The good is not essence, but, like the sun, exceeds that which it produces in our eyes. There are four principles of the soul: reason, understanding, faith (conviction) and perception.

Human beings live in an underground den, a world of shadow and deception. This life is what you make it: "a rose beside the river's brim is what you see in it." Not so the real truth. You can't make it to suit your mind. It is so real that you cannot see in it anything *of it*, you can only see IT. We do not see anything on this earth but are only patches of light and shade on the retina of our eye – upside down at that, which it is our privileged to interpret, every man as he will – and none shall be the norm! How can anything be seen or known in such a world? It can't. It is the duty of the philosopher to descend into the prison house and tell people the fact, also to give them encouragement, for all have the intuition necessary to achieving the real truth. Close your eyes, dear reader, and try to think perfect darkness. Shut yourself in a closet blindfolded and try to see the darkness. The vision of light cannot be dismissed from the mind: the brain seems to be flooded with light coming from somewhere. If you are hit over the head you say all goes black. How can you can make such an outlandish assumption if you don't remember anything that happened? How can you remember the blackness if you were unconscious? Why is the blackness so much blacker at one time than another if there is no light at all? Plato suggests that the nearest approach that can be made to teaching this knowledge is in the teaching of mathematics, the "exact" science. In our world there is no point to asking what? That is something different to all, and therein harmonists and astronomers alike fail. The way to absolute truth is *why*? The one question that might be answered alike by two persons. The vehicle for such is dialectic. Mathematicians are most successful when they apply laws and principles once discovered without asking why, but only by the promptings of experience – it doesn't pay to be too curious in a "math" class. In fact, curiosity will ruin one's chances of shining in that subject. "I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning," says Socrates. Nevertheless, the mathematical method is the best. The better part of the soul trusts to measure and calculation.

[Nibley writes in long hand:] This is unfortunately not the end – I have over 100 pages that go on like this. Authorities & sources for all quotations & other exact assertions will be freely revealed on request.

Transcribed and re-formatted

by Gary Gillum, 9/27/07